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INTRODUCTION

Repeating the current litany of concerns about an apparent rise in
protectionist rhetoric in the United States and abroad is not the aim of
this Article. Rather, its focus is on describing and explaining changes in
the pattern of protectionism that have emerged in the United States and
other industrialized nations since World War II through use of a simple
analytical framework. With generous reference to the abundant literature on the political economy of trade restrictions, this Article also attempts to explain the shift in protectionism from tariff to non-tariff
barriers over the last two decades. It also describes how the changing
pattern of protectionism is likely to influence future trade policy in both
the United States and abroad.'
The model constructed in this Article explains how the efforts of
special interest groups within a nation interact with its domestic political
and foreign policy objectives to influence the nation's overall structure of
trade regulations. Section II of the Article, therefore, begins by providing a simple analytical framework which can help to explain the evolution of both the pattern and the level of protectionism in the United
States and other countries.2 Section III of the Article reviews the history
I There are a number of useful surveys of the literature of United States trade policy in the postWorld War II period. See generally Baldwin, The PoliticalEconomy of Postwar U.S. Trade Policy,
BULL. N.Y.U. GRAD. ScH. Bus. No. 4 (1976)[hereinafter PoliticalEconomy]; Baldwin, The Changing Nature of U.S. Trade Policy Since World War II, in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF
RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 5 (R. Baldwin & A. Krueger eds. 1984)[hereinafter Changing Nature];
R.

BALDWIN, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: A RESPONSE TO SHIFTS IN NATIONAL ECONOMIC

POWER (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1823)(1986)[hereinafter NEW
PROTECTIONISM]; W. Kaempfer, Explaining the Mode of Protection: A Public Choice Perspective
(1987)(unpublished thesis, University of Colorado); S. Marks, Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Protection: A Survey and Some New Results (1987)(unpublished manuscript, Pomona College & Claremont Graduate School).
2 There have been numerous studies of the determinants of trade restrictions within individual
nations. See generally Baack & Ray, The Political Economy of Tariff Policy: .4 Case Study of the
United States, 20 EXPLORATIONS ECON. HIST. 73 (1983); Caves, Economic Models of Political
Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure, 9 CAN. J. ECON. 278 (1976); R. CAVES & R. JONES, WORLD
TRADE AND PAYMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 211 (2d ed. 1977); Cheh, United States Concessionsin
the Kennedy Round and Short-Run LaborAdjustment Costs, 4 J. INT'L ECON. 323 (1974)[hereinafter
U.S. Concessions]; Cheh, A Note on Tariffs, NontarifBarriersandLabor Protection in United States
ManufacturingIndustries, 84 J. POL. ECON. 389 (1976)[hereinafter A Note on Tariffs]; Deardorff &
Stem, American Labor'sStake in InternationalTrade, in TARIFFS, QUOTAS AND TRADE: THE POLITICS OF PROTECTIONISM 125 (1979); Fieleke, The Incidence of the U.S. Tariff Structure on Consumption, 10 PUB. POL'Y 639 (1971); Helleiner, The PoliticalEconomy of Canada'sTariff Structure:
An Alternative Model, 10 CAN. J. ECON. 318 (1977); Marvel, Foreign Trade and Domestic Competition, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 103 (1980); Marvel & Ray, The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the United States, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 190 (1983)[hereinafter The
Kennedy Round]; Marvel & Ray, IntraindustryTrade: Sources and Effects on Protection, 95 J. POL.
ECON. 1278 (1987)[hereinafter Intraindustry Trade]; Pugel & Walter, U.S. Corporate Interests and
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of United States trade policy and summarizes the current economic and
political climate for protectionist legislation in the United States. The
Article will then expand its analysis in Section IV by attempting to explain historical events more fully in terms of the framework set out in
Section II. Section V describes the reasons behind the growth in nontariff barriers ("NTBs") over the past several decades. Finally, Section
VI attempts to explain the current pattern of international trade restrictions,3 and to forecast the direction in which events are likely to move in
the PoliticalEconomy of Trade Policy, 67 REv. ECON. & STAT. 465 (1985); Pincus, Pressure Groups
and the Pattern of Tariffs, 83 J. POL. EON. 757 (1975); Ray, The Determinantsof Tariffand NonTariff Trade Restriction in the United States, 89 J. POL. EON. 105 (198 1)[hereinafter Determinants
of Tariff]; Riedel, Tariff Concessionsin the Kennedy Round and the Structure ofProtection in West
Germany, 7 J. INT'L ECON. 133 (1977); Stem, The US. Tariffand the Efficiency of the U.S. Economy, 54 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROc. 459 (1964); Stone, A Comment on Tariffs, Nontariff
Barriersand LaborProtection in the UnitedStates ManufacturingIndustries, 86 J.POL. ECON. 954
(1978); F. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1931); Tosini & Tower, The
Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinantsof CongressionalVoting Patterns,54 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1987).
3 There have been numerous studies of the determinants of trade restrictions among trading
partners, particularly regarding industrialized and developing country trade. See generally B.
BALASSA, THE STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1971)[hereinafter THE
STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION]; Balassa, The Impact of the Industrial Countries' TariffStructure on
their Imports of Manufacturesfor Less Developed Areas, 34 ECONOMICA 372 (1967)[hereinafter
Tariff Structure Impact]; Bhagwati, On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas, in TRADE, TARIFFS
AND GROWTH (J. Bhagwati ed. 1969); D. CLARKE, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE
UNITED STATES' CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT (1987); Deardorff & Stern, The
Structure of TariffProtection:Effects of Foreign Tariffs andExisting NTBs, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT.
539 (1985); Grossman, Import Competitionfor Developed and Developing Countries, 64 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 271 (1982); Krugman, New Theories of Trade Among IndustrialCountries, 73 AM. EcON.
REV. PAPERS & PRoC. 343 (1983); Ray, The Optimum Commodity Tariff and Tariff Rates in Developed and Less Developed Countries, 56 REV. ECON. & STAT. 369 (1974)[hereinafter The Optimum
Commodity Tariff]; Ray, Tariffand NontariffBarriersto Trade in the United States andAbroad, 63
REV. ECON. & STAT. 161 (1981)[hereinafter Tariff and Nontariff Barriers]; Ray, The Impact of
SpecialInterests on PreferentialTariff Concessionsby the UnitedStates, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 187
(1987)[hereinafter Impact of Special Interests]; E. Ray, U.S. Protection and Intraindustry Trade:
Evidence and Implications (1987)(unpublished manuscript)[hereinafter U.S. Protection]; Ray &
Marvel, The Pattern of Protection in the Industrialized World, 66 REV. ECON. & STAT. 452 (1984);
Verreydt & Waelbroeck, European Community Protection Against Manufactured Importsfrom Developing Countries:A Case Study in the PoliticalEconomy of Protection, in IMPORT COMPETITION
AND RESPONSE 369 (J.Bhagwati ed. 1982).
Along quite different lines, a number of papers have speculated about changes that might be
made in the mechanisms that determine trade policies to encourage a continuation of the trade
liberalization of the last forty years. These papers address the trade policy determinants of not only
the United States, but other General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") members as well.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
187. See generally S.Arendt, Aspects of Trade and Protection (1987)(unpublished manuscript, University of California, Santa Cruz & Commons Institute of International Studies); R. BALDWIN, ALTERNATIVE LIBERALIZATION STRATEGIES (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 2045)(1986); Goldstein & Krasner, Unfair Trade Practices:The Casefor a DifferentialResponse,
74 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 282 (1984); R. Snape, Bilateral-Multilateral Tension in Trade
Policy (1987)(unpublished manuscript, Monash University & World Bank); C. Wihlborg, Proposals
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the years to come.

II.
A.

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The Micro and Macro Views of Policy Decisionmaking

Historically, there have been two generally accepted explanations of
how trade policy is determined. The first-the micro view-is that trade
policy is the aggregate outcome of industry battles over protection; government policy simply mirrors the preferences of industrial constituents.
The second-the macro view-is that the international policy of a given
government may be difficult to trace back to individual industry interests.
The central government acts as an independent agent reflecting aggregate
or collective interests. In this view, national objectives are the primary
determinants of domestic and international policies. National governments interact to determine international trade policies. In this context,
protectionist positions are heavily influenced by the means available to
nations for adjudicating trade disputes between countries.
Studies stressing the macro perspective have attempted to demonstrate how the mechanisms for adjudicating trade disputes between countries might be changed to move the United States and the rest of the
4
world back toward a more consistent trade liberalization stance. Implicit in many of these papers is the notion that government trade policies
are constrained by domestic concerns, such as full employment, price
stability, and economic growth, that are not necessarily related to the
wants of any particular interest group, but are of great concern to the
populace as a whole. In this view, trade policy is an integral part of both
national domestic policy and foreign policy.
The micro perspective presumes that special interest groups shape
the pattern of protection within a given country.' This perspective often
leaves the impression that government policy is either a weighted sum of
the preferences of special interest groups adopted in a passive fashion or
for Reforming National Structures for Policy Making in International Trade (1987)(unpublished
manuscript, University of Southern California & Claremont Graduate School). While the present
Article will touch upon many of the points raised in the literature supra, it will not include detailed
attributions of arguments or explanations of empirical findings. Readers interested in such details
should refer to the original works.
4 See generallyPoliticalEconomy, supra note 1; ChangingNature,supra note 1; NEW PROTECTIONISM, supra note 1; R. BALDWIN, supra note 3; Goldstein & Krasner, supra note 3; R. Snape,
supra note 3; C. Wihlborg, supra note 3.
5 See generally Cheh, US. Concessions,supra note 2; Cheh, A Note on Tariffs, supra note 2; D.
CLARKE, supranote 3; Deardorif & Stern, supra note 2; Pugel & Walter, supra note 2; Pincus, supra
note 2; Ray, The Optimum Commodity Tariff,supra note 3; Ray, Determinantsof Tariff,supra note
2; Ray, Tariff and NontarifBarriers,supra note 3; Ray, Impact of Special Interests, supra note 3;
Riedel, supra note 2; Stone, supra note 2; F. TAUssIG, supra note 2; Tosini & Tower, supra note 2.
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the end product of a sinister calculation by a group of frightened politicians who are committed to nothing but keeping themselves in office.
While there are times when governments appear to behave in a way
that is consistent with one or the other of these views, there is .little evidence to suggest that either is superior to the other as a general model for
predicting government behavior. Within the context of the StiglerPeltzman-Becker framework, 6 one can argue that in conjunction with the
equilibrium distribution of rents established in a regulated market, there
is in fact also a political equilibrium that is the product of both selfinterest (the micro view) and shared values (the macro approach). This
Article argues that contemporary trade policy is best understood in this
light. That is, trade policy actually results from the interaction of selfpromoting economic interest groups with national economic and political
policies. These latter "national" policies represent shared or consensus
values which are slow to change and thus are quite durable. This Article
describes these values and their effectiveness in checking protectionist demands over the last decade.
B.

A Combined Framework

What follows is a simple attempt to define an analytical framework
with which one can analyze the post-war pattern of protectionism generally described in Section IV. The debate over trade policy in Congress in
the last decade has resulted in the kind of policy drift consistent only
with a genuine clash between long-held national principles and the pressures that are generated by special interest groups. The model proposed
here is that United States trade policy is the joint product of these two
6 Recent articles have extended the work by Stigler on the political economy of industrial regulation. See, eg., Becker, Comment, 19 J.L. & ECON. 245 (1976)[hereinafter Comment]; Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371 (1983);
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976); Stigler, The
Economic Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). This literature has provided insight into the problems of voter support faced by a government that accedes to the wishes of
special interest groups at the expense of the general voting public. See Peltzman, supra; Becker,
Comment, supra. Becker has expanded upon his earlier argument that government regulations establish a pattern for the distribution of economic rents and that changes in the pattern are likely to
occur only if political or economic conditions change enough to disturb the initial equilibrium distribution. Economic rents are pure profits or monopoly profits that can be redistributed without
changing resource allocation decisions. An equilibrium distribution of rents is simply an allocation
of monopoly profits that will persist through time unless it is disturbed by changing economic or
political conditions. While it is useful to think of trade policy as an attempt to distribute rents
generated by trade restrictions and to explain policy changes as the product of changed political or
economic fortunes, such an approach can only have predictive content if we can explain precisely
how changing economic and political conditions influence policy. How trade is regulated or restricted determines who gets rents and who does not. Therefore, special interests attempt to influence both the extent to which trade is restricted and the method of restricting trade.
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clashing forces. This framework combines elements of both the micro
and macro perspectives within it; both national political objectives and
economic special interest groups play a significant role in defining trade
policy.
The first step in demonstrating the model's efficacy is to show that
shared national values actually exist. There is a great deal of evidence
supporting this proposition, as seen in the hypothesis that governments
in industrialized countries are committed to the shared value of providing a trade restriction safety net 7 for weak industries. Two researchers
have demonstrated empirically that declining industries not only were
favored by minimal Kennedy Round tariff cuts, but were also given enhanced protection in the form of NTBs. s In addition, it has been argued
that shifts in United States trade policy, including the adoption of the
Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") and the Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI"),9 resulted from a national foreign policy commitment to
aid developing nations trying to compete effectively for exports of manufactured goods. 10 These programs are clearly inconsistent with the longstanding United States policy of adhering to the most favored nation
("MFN") principle." This inconsistency suggests an activist government that is not simply responding to special interests or voters.
Although the aforementioned policies suggest that shared values
7 This paper uses the term "safety net" here in the same sense that the Reagan Administration
referred to Social Security and other domestic welfare programs as a safety net for low-income individuals in the United States.
8 Marvel & Ray, The Kennedy Round, supra note 2, at 190, 192; Ray & Marvel, supra note 3, at
457. "Non-tariff barrier" ("NTB") describes many different types of non-tariff trade restrictions.
Such restrictions may be formalized agreements (such as voluntary export restraints ("VERs")),
restrictive unilateral government policies or technical standards, or cultural barriers to the purchase
of goods produced abroad. For a review of the NTBs that are the subject of much of the current
international negotiation, see e.g, Marks & Malgrem, Negotiating Nontarff Distortions to Trade, 7
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 327 (1975).
9 The Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") is intended to provide developing countries
with preferential treatment by granting them duty-free access to United States markets for many of
their exports. See Sapir & Lundberg, The U.S. GeneralizedSystem of Preferences and Its Impact, in
THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 196 (1984). The Carribean
Basin Initiative ("CBI"), adopted in 1983 and implemented in 1984, seeks to provide Caribbean
countries with duty-free access to United States markets for key exports. Carribean Basin Economic
Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-06 (1986 Cum. Supp.); see also D. CLARKE, supra note 3.
10 Ray, Impact of Special Interests, supra note 3, at 193.
11 The main purpose of the most favored nation ("MFN") principle is to secure freer trade
through negotiated reciprocal reductions in tariffs between members of the GATT. All contracting
parties undertake to negoiate tariff reductions with one another and to extend the same reductions to
other members. For example, if A and B negotiate both a reduction in B's tariff on A's exports of
stereos to B and a reduction in A's tariffs on B's exports of automobiles to A, A and B have to extend
the same reductions on stereos and cars to all parties to GATT. A. MACBEAN & P. SNOWDEN,
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN TRADE AND FINANCE 10

(1981).
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play an important role in decisionmaking, one must be aware that special
interests are also a contributing factor. For example, there is evidence
that special interest groups influenced the content of the GSP and effectively undermined its goal of opening up United States markets for key
exports from developing countries. 2 One might therefore be led to believe that United States policy is merely the servant of economic special
interest groups, and that policies like the GSP and CBI are part of a cruel
charade. A brief discussion of the "pure" special interest group model of
trade policy decisionmaking is thus in order.
The special interest group model cannot be understood unless one is
quite specific about the makeup of the various special interest groups
which try to influence trade policy and which groups constitute the winners and losers. One important group is consumers, who always have an
interest in freer trade for access to a variety of products at the least possible cost.13 In addition, highly competitive export-oriented firms and
their workers will favor free trade because domestic trade restrictions
may lead to retaliation from abroad and reduce foreign market access.
In contrast, producers and workers in less competitive or import sensitive sectors of the economy will always favor protection. Trade restrictions can preserve jobs and protect profits that would otherwise be lost to
foreign competitors.
Four modest extensions complete a summary of the key elements of
all of the special interest models and aid in the construction of a paradigm. First, assume that consumers are a diverse group who cannot
form an effective coalition to promote free trade, and the price of producing an effective lobby for protection increases with the size of the interested group. One may conclude that concentrated industries with a
handful of dominant firms will be more effective in obtaining protection
than industries with many small firms. Second, firms that purchase capital equipment or other intermediate goods abroad will surely favor freer
trade for those goods. Third, these importing industries are likely to be
more concentrated than consumers, creating a presumption that protection will be biased toward final consumer goods and away from intermediate inputs. Fourth, the government serves simply as the agent for all of
these interests while pursuing a trade policy consistent with its own survival or electability.1 4
12 See Ray, Impact of Special Interests, supra note 3, at 183.
13 In fact, it is reasonable to assume that as incomes rise, consumer preference for diversity
intensifies.
14 Empirical evidence supporting this simple, stylized view of how trade policy is determined is
extensive. It includes Caves, supra note 2; Chel, U.S. Concessions, supra note 2; Cheh, A Note on
Tariffs,supra note 2; D. CLARKE, supra note 3; Deardorff & Stem, supra note 2; Marvel, supra note
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The pure special interest model clearly presents an incomplete picture of how trade policy is formed, however. Most plainly, it ignores
foreign policy.1 5 The United States-Israel and United States-Canada free
trade agreements, and attempts to provide preferential access to United
States markets for manufactured imports from developing countries
through the GSP and the CBI, suggest that as a nation we have staked
out international political positions which do not easily follow from the
pure special interest model. The current battle between the executive
branch and Congress over trade policy shows that at a time when special
interest groups are quite outspoken in their demands for government
trade relief, the government is working hard to maintain the nation's
long-standing commitment to continued trade liberalization. This type
of conflict cannot be explained by a model in which the government proceeds to make policy decisions based solely on its appraisal of the wishes
of special interest groups.
In light of the foregoing, it becomes clear that the federal government, as a distinct, separate entity, is itself a key player in the trade policymaking process. Particular government actions are guided by
established national policies subject to feedback from special interest
groups. When both national preferences and special interest group preferences favor trade liberalization (as this Article will argue they did in
the early post-World War II period), national policy will be unambiguously in favor of freer trade. When national preferences are for freer
trade and competition, but special interest preferences are on balance
protectionist (as this Article will argue they have been in recent years),
United States policy on international trade will reflect the kind of ambiguity we are now observing. The presumption is that national policy can
be turned away from the current pro-trade stance if a special interest
group bias continues to remain strong for a number of years.
The primary distinction between the model proposed here and the
normal special interest group models is that the government is explicitly
included as an active player with a long-term agenda of its own. The
government is sensitive to special interest group pressures but is not their
2; Marvel & Ray, The Kennedy Round, supra note 2; Pugel & Walter, supra note 2; Pincus, supra
note 2; Ray, The Optimum Commodity Tariff,supra note 3; Ray, Determinants of Tariff,supra note
2; Ray, Tariff and NontariffBarriers,supra note 3; Stone, supra note 2; Tosini & Tower, supra note
2.
15 Domestic policy concerns also do not necessarily follow the special interest model. Examples
of national policies which have evolved over many years and appear to respond slowly, if at all, to
interest group pressures include: 1) the civil rights movement of the 1960s; 2) the development,
expansion, and finally the indexing of social security payments in the early 1970s; and 3) the developing consensus on national catastrophic insurance.
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captive. At the same time government policy is not unrelated to the concerns of special interest groups. If special interest group preferences persist in favoring a particular stand on trade issues, the national agenda
may shift to adopt that position. This model highlights the dynamic interaction between individual and collective interests which is so important to an understanding of current United States policy. 6 As this
Article proceeds, the value of this model as an analytical tool will become increasingly apparent.
III.

THE PATTERN OF PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

The value of providing some historical perspective to any study of
trade policy or protectionism is suggested by the now common caution
that history does indeed repeat, but never in exactly the same way.
Drawing simpleminded historical parallels can thus be as foolhardy as
ignoring history altogether. If analyzed properly, however, history can

provide useful insights. For example, in the late nineteenth century the
United States built a world class navy in order to assume the role of a
major player in international political affairs. Coincidentally, that same
period saw the emergence of major manufacturing sectors such as steel
and textiles as serious competitors in world markets. That combination
of national ambitions and private economic interests played a critical role
16 While this model has not been tested explicitly, there are a number of trade studies that do
provide support for the view that national as well as special interest considerations have influenced
the structure of trade restrictions in the United States. One study has demonstrated that United
States tariffs were structured in the late-19th century to promote industrialization of the country.
See Baack & Ray, supra note 2, at 79. Specifically, it found that tariff protection was greatest for fast
growth industries in the late-19th century United States and that tariffs were reduced or removed as
industries (including steel) became competitive in world markets. Id. at 83. In addition, Marvel and
Ray provide evidence consistent with the view that the Kennedy Round tariff cuts and the simultaneous expansion in the use of NTBs in the United States were intended to minimize the impact of
trade liberalization on weak industries without augmenting the profitability of fast growth industries.
Marvel & Ray, The Kennedy Round, supra note 2, at 193. In particular, they found that Kennedy
Round cuts were greatest in fast growth, "R&D" intensive industries and least in slow growth or
declining industries and in consumer manufacturing in which the United States was losing its competitive edge in international trade. Furthermore, they provide statistical evidence that nontariff
trade restrictions were added to tariff protection for weak industries including manufactured consumer goods. Id. at 193-96.
In a third study, Ray argues that the timing and nature of the GSP and CBI legislation can be
understood best when viewed as a compromise between a national commitment to aid developing
country industrialization and the desire of affected special interest groups to blunt the threat of
cheap imports in their domestic product markets. Ray, Impact ofSpecial Interests, supra note 3, at
187. Ray provides direct evidence that both the GSP and CBI provided developing countries with
duty free access to United States markets for manufactured exports. But that access was biased
away from declining, noncompetitive industries such as textiles and processed foods. Unfortunately,
those are the industries that could most benefit from access to the United States market. Id. at 190.
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in shifting United States trade policy away from highly protective tariffs
toward freer trade at the turn of the last century.
In the late twentieth century the United States faces changed political and economic fortunes that threaten to end four decades of commitment to trade liberalization. The framework outlined above can explain
these changes, if considered in the historical context of the last 100 years.
The shift in political support toward protectionist legislation in the
United States in the last decade, for example, is not without precedent.
Political support for trade liberalization within the United States during
the 1950s and 1960s is also not without precedent. A brief review of
United States history demonstrates how economic interest groups can
and have reinforced or undermined federal government trade policies.
A recent study of trade policy in the United States during the last
half of the nineteenth century 7 identified a number of important relationships behind the trade policy of the time. First, contrary to the general thrust of United States trade policy throughout most of the postWorld War II period, the United States pursued a policy of high tariffs
throughout its period of rapid industrialization between 1870 and 1914.
Based on a sample of 97 manufacturing industries (including every industry that proved to be significant in 1914), the average United States
tariff rate was 45.8% in 1870, 40.6% in 1910 and 26.3% in 1914 following the substantial tariff cuts associated with the Underwood-Simmons
Tariff Act of October 1913.18
Second, contrary to the characterization offered in Taussig's classic
study, 19 United States tariff policy appears to have been systematically
geared to accommodate rapid industrialization. Specifically, the study
found that tariff protection was concentrated on finished manufactured
goods rather than intermediate goods.20 That same general strategy has
been used by developing countries in this century to promote import substitution in manufacturing.2 ' While the results of contemporary cases
are somewhat mixed, the historical evidence suggests that throughout the
period from 1870 to 1914, those manufacturing sectors which were
highly protected by the tariff structure in 1870 emerged as the most rapidly expanding industries in the United States.2 2 Finally, the study noted
that tariffs were systematically higher on liquor, tobacco products, and
17 Baack & Ray, supra note 2, at 73.
18 Id. at 77. See Underwood Tariff Act, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913)(current version at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 128, 130, 131; 46 U.S.C. § 146 (1982)).
19 F. TAUSSIG, supra note 2.

20 Baack & Ray, supra note 2, at 80.
21 Id. at 77.
22 Id. at 79.
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other price inelastic commodities2 3 which one would expect to be reliable
sources of federal government revenue at a time when tariffs funded well
over half of the federal budget.2 4
The point to emphasize is that during its industrialization period the
United States was highly protectionist, used tariff policy to promote the
growth of its manufacturing sector, and relied heavily on tariffs to fund
central government programs. Those policies can be seen in many developing countries today and present a sharp contrast to the trade liberalization stance that the United States has professed for the last fifty years.2 5
Except for the brief interval of time associated with the SmootHawley Tariff of 1930,26 (resulting in tariffs reaching an all time high
average of 59% in 1932), tariffs have declined steadily in the United
States from 1914 to 1986 (when the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") Tokyo Round tariff cuts were scheduled to be fully
implemented).2 7 The rapid decline in United States tariffs from 59% in
1932, to a little over 7% after the implementation of the Kennedy Round
tariff cuts by the early 1970s, paralleled changes in other industrialized
nations and contributed to a genuine sense of progress toward free international trade. The model set forth in Section II should be able to explain how these changes came about.2"
23 Price inelastic goods are those for which price increases induce little or no decrease in the
quantity demanded.
24 Baack & Ray, supra note 2, at 77, 80.
25 For a discussion of protectionist policies in developing countries, see B. BALASSA, supra note
3; Bhagwati, Shifting Comparative Advantage, ProtectionistDemands, and Policy Responses, in IMPORT COMPETITION AND RESPONSE (J. Bhagwati ed. 1982); A. KRUEGER, LIBERALISATION ATTEMPTS AND CONSEQUENCES (1978); Ray, The Optimum Commodity Tariff,supra note 3.
26 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930), as amended by the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501 et seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985) and the Trade and TariffAct of 1984,
19 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
27 The United States played a major role in establishing GATT in 1947 and in promoting its
expansion from the original 22 member countries to more than 90 today. It also played a key role in
setting the trade liberalizing agenda in the seven rounds of GATT trade negotiations. These rounds
took place in 1947, 1949, 1950, 1955, 1960-61, 1962-67, and 1973-79. See Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, Law and World Economc Interdependence, in IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND 1, 11
(1984). The last three rounds have come to be known as the Dillon, Kennedy, and Tokyo Rounds,
respectively. The Tokyo Round tariff cuts were scheduled to be fully implemented by 1986. For a
good discussion of GATTs background and operation, see G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY: THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE AND ITS IMPACT ON
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES AND TECHNIQUES (1965). The latest round of multilateral

trade negotiations (the Uruguay Round) convened in Geneva in late 1987. See Minsterial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, reprintedin GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 33d Supp., 19 (1987). However suspect United States motives may seem, President Ronald W. Reagan has been among those calling for
the current negotiations.
28 A number of studies that have focused on the consequences of multilateral trade concessions
have found that the benefits to participating countries have far outweighed any adverse effects associ-
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Another important aspect of the pattern of protectionism in the past
several decades is the growth in NTBs. Even before the Kennedy Round
concluded, a number of authors noted either that: 1) the multilateral
agreements were not providing substantial access to industrial country
markets for the manufactured exports of developing countries;29 or 2) remaining NTBs might affect trade differently than would tariffs.3" Unfortunately, NTBs have yet to be successfully addressed in any of the
GATT negotiating rounds. The negotiators at the Kennedy Round meetings abandoned their efforts to deal with NTBs when it became clear that
their work on tariff cuts would warrant their full attention.3" The negotiators at the Tokyo Round did succeed in hammering out codes of conduct for the use of NTBs, but actual agreements to reduce them in line
with tariff cuts remained for later rounds of multilateral negotiations.
The fact that international negotiations have not dealt effectively
with NTBs is a crucial element in any explanation of the shifting pattern
of protectionism in the last twenty-five years. If trade policy is determined by the impact of economic special interests within a country on
the national political agenda through the political process, the outcome
at any point will surely be influenced by underlying political and economic circumstances. Which positions ultimately prevail, however, will
also depend upon the means available for controlling trade flows. This
Article argues that as NTBs have become more effective and more prevalent protectionist devices, they have also increased the likelihood that
protectionist interests will be successful in any given set of political and
economic circumstances.

IV.

EXPLAINING THE HISTORY OF PROTECTIONISM
IN THE UNITED STATES

The changing pattern of protectionism in the United States over the
course of the last century is not difficult to explain if one keeps the model
set forth in Section II in mind. This model suggests that trade policies
are ultimately defined by governments which act in accordance with
ated with short-term adjustment costs. See, e.g., Baldwin, Trade and Employment Effects in the
United States of Multilateral Tariff Reductions, 66 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 142 (1976);
Baldwin & Lage, A Multilateral Model of Trade Balancing Tariff Concessions, 53 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 237 (1971).
29 See generally B. BALASSA, THE STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION, supra note 3; Balassa, Tariff
Structure Impact, supra note 3.
30 See generally Bhagwati, supra note 3; Fischelson & Flatters, The (Non)Equivalenceof Optimal
Tariffs and Quotas Under Uncertainty, 5 J. INT'L ECON. 385 (1975); Kreinen, More on the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas, 23 KYKLOS 75 (1970).
31 See L. GLICK, MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: WORLD TRADE AFTER THE TOKYO

ROUND 8 (1984).
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shared social values subject to special interest group pressures. Changes
in political and economic conditions and innovations in methods of protection contribute to changes in the protectionist regime within any given
country. Applying the model to historical trends provides worthwhile
examples of the changing nature of protectionism.
A. Partisan Politics and the Model
After the end of the Civil War, Congress was dominated by eastern
economic interests which strongly supported rapid industrialization.
This support produced a consensus that the United States should promote industrialization. The rapid industrialization that subsequently occurred undercut arguments that further protection was needed.
Consequently, export interests became more important over time and, on
balance, special interest groups favored free trade. This shift from protectionism to substantial trade liberalization took nearly twenty years.3 2
The sixteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, passed in
1913 and authorizing the collection of income taxes, resolved a conflict
between the general consensus to liberalize trade and the need to finance
rapidly expanding federal programs.33
A striking paradox in United States trade policy that the proposed
analytical framework must explain are the positions on trade policy
which have historically been taken by the two primary political parties.
Throughout the late nineteenth century, Democrats opposed the high
tariffs adopted by Congress and fought to reduce them. Republicans
were equally staunch in their support for high tariffs. By contrast, in the
post-World War II era Democrats have systematically championed protectionist legislation over the objections of the Republicans. This apparent reversal of the major parties with respect to trade restrictions is
explained by reference to the proposed model.34
What has changed since World War II is not the respective parties'
constituencies but rather the economic interests of those constituencies.
32 Democrats with traditional strength in the South and West favored freer trade throughout the
late nineteenth century, in support of western agricultural interests and consumers who wanted
cheap imports. As industrialization proceeded, pro-business Republicans joined the Democrats,
shifting from favoring protection to favoring foreign sales and foreign direct investments.
33 Tariffs were previously a major source of revenue for the United States government and had to
fund massive expenditures such as the nation's first major peacetime military build-up in the country's history that began in the early 1880s.
34 One key factor, of course, was the elimination of any further need for tariff revenues. Both
Republicans (who had earlier supported protectionism because that policy aided manufacturers) and
Democrats (who had supported trade liberalization because it helped their predominantly agriculture-based constituents) endorsed reductions in tariffs once the government finance bottleneck had
been removed, and it became clear that manufacturers wanted to go after foreign market sales.
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Even before the depression of the 1930s solidified labor support for the
Democrats, the basic division between Democrats and Republicans put
farmers and industrial workers in the Democrat camp and business in
the Republican camp. During the 1950s and early 1960s both Democrats and Republicans supported trade liberalization because United
States agricultural and manufactured products dominated competition in
world markets. Democrats, however, became divided on the trade issue
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. It then became clear that despite
continued United States competitiveness in agricultural products and
capital equipment, some industries (like textiles, footwear, steel, and
automobiles) were beginning to lose sales to foreign competitors. Democrats pushed programs to provide unemployment assistance to steel and
auto workers, and they also supported trigger prices and quotas in steel
and textiles. Although most of the push for protection has come from
Democrats, by the late 1970s Republicans from "rust belt" states (like
Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois) which were particularly affected
by the decline in United States steel and auto sales, also supported relief
from import competition. The positions of the two major political parties on trade issues have thus changed in response to the changing preferences of their constituent special interest groups; this shift lends credence
to the model proposed above.
B.

Historical Data and the Model

An examination of historical data highlights the long-term relationship between tariffs in the United States and key economic variables related to our model for the period 1913 to 1980. 3 ' This relationship helps
illustrate the direct and predictable link between changes in domestic and
international economic conditions and United States trade policy over
the course of the last century. Specifically, analysis shows that when special interests and national policies coincided to support or oppose trade
restrictions, United States trade policies were unambiguous. When the
net impact of special interest groups is poised in opposition to declared
national policy on trade issues, as seems to be the case today, actual trade
policy appears contradictory, ambiguous, or both.
It is clear that tariffs have declined substantially between 1913 and
1980, while per capita income has increased.3 6 A more careful look at
the data makes it clear that rising incomes in the period from 1913 to
1920 were accompanied by tariff cuts from 17.4% to 6%. As income
35 See Baack & Ray, supra note 2. The underlying economic figures and data are provided in
Appendix A to this Article.
36 See app. A, chart A-1.
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fluctuated during the 1920s and plummeted during the early 1930s, tariffs rose quickly to almost 12% in 1921 and a high of 24% in 1932.17 In
1933, average income reached a low point in the United States and, as
incomes recovered throughout the post-World War II period, tariff rates
generally declined. 38 That inverse relationship between tariffs and incomes is consistent with the assumption that rising incomes are associated with increasing consumer preferences for product variety which
consequently leads to pressure for liberalization in international trade.
Data from 1913 to 1980 illustrate the relationship between tariff
protection and business cycles,39 as indicated by the occurrence of recessions in the United States economy in that period. 4' Based on the model
discussed in Section II, one would expect special interest groups to be
most united against free trade when economic conditions are depressed
and most solidly in favor of free trade during relatively prosperous times
and the data bear out this expectation. Tariffs increased with the recession of 1921 and 1922 and with the beginning of the depression in 1930.
Until 1939, the average tariff rate on imports did not fall below the preDepression 1929 level of 13.5%. The consequent steady decline in tariffs
ended during the recession in 1950, and tariffs rose slightly in 1951. Similarly, tariffs increased slightly during the recessions of 1958 and 1974-75
and following the recession in 1961.
Economic declines, and the job losses and business failures that they
inevitably bring, have served to rally support for restrictions on international trade. It is therefore not surprising that pressures to restrict trade
were less during the 1950s and 1960s, when recessions were less frequent
and severe, than during the 1970s and early 1980s, when the United
States experienced its most severe recessions since World War 11.41
An interesting relationship also exists between tariff protection and
the relative commodity export strength of the United States in interna37 See app. A, table A-1. The measure of tariffs referenced in this section is the average tariff
rate across all imports, rather than the tariff rate on dutiable imports used in much of the empirical
literature.
38 See app. A, chart A-1.
39 Business cycles are most simply defined as periods of national economic activity that include
an expansion, peak, slowdown, and negative economic growth. In the post World War II period,
expansions have averaged two to four years, and slowdown periods or recessions have averaged one
to two years.
40 See app. A, chart A-2.
41 The United States is committed as a matter of national policy to protecting jobs and declining
industries. Marvel and Ray identified that "safety net" aspect of United States trade policy when
they observed that Kennedy Round tariff cuts were the least for slow growth and declining industries. See Marvel & Ray, The Kennedy Round, supra note 2, at 193-96.
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tional trade.4 2 This relationship4 3 once again highlights the association
between special interest group demands for protection from import competition and the ability of United States firms to compete. One expects
support for trade liberalization to increase and fall in concert with the
success or failure of United States companies in selling more goods and
services abroad than foreigners sell in the United States. This expectation, too, is supported by the data. For every year from 1936 to 1970, net
merchandise exports from the United States were positive and often quite
high relative to the sum of imports and exports. The relative net export
figure averaged 37.7% during the 1940s, 10.7% during the 1950s, and
9.8% during the 1960s. 4 During the early post-war period, the United
States took the lead in promoting trade liberalization, not only because of
its advantage in international competitiveness, but also because this
stance helped achieve the foreign policy goals of re-industrializing wartorn Europe and Japan and including developing nations as trading partners in the world economy. In the context of the framework set forth
above, it is worth noting that throughout the 1950s and the 1960s these
foreign policy goals reinforced the international economic interests of the
highly competitive United States business community.
Tariff movements and changes in the relative size of the trade sec4
5
tor in the United States since 1913 also bear out the usefulness of the
42 The rapidly changing nature of world commodity markets throughout the 1960s raised questions about the causes of a country's economic competitiveness and how it evolves over time. Two
commentators provided early insight into the changing nature of comparative advantage in the
United States. Among their principal findings were that the United States was relatively strong in
exporting technologically sophisticated products that required skilled labor, and relatively weak in
competing for international sales of goods that could be mass produced using cheap, low-skilled
labor. See Baldwin, Determinants of the Commodity Structure of U.S. Trade, 61 AM. ECON. REV.
126, 142 (1971); Hufbauer, The Impact of NationalCharacteristicsand Technology on the Commodity Composition of Trade in Manufactured Goods, in THE TECHNOLOGY FACTOR IN INTERNA-

TIONAL TRADE (R. Vernon ed. 1970). Those findings quite naturally led to attempts to estimate
whether or not the Kennedy Round had yielded a pattern of protection of less competitive, domestically produced, low-skill, labor intensive goods. Two investigations demonstrated a systematic bias
in post-Kennedy Round protection in the United States in favor of these products. See Cheh, U.S.
Concessions, supra note 2, at 335; Cheh, A Note on Tariffs, supra note 2, at 394. Another scholar
provided empirical evidence that United States tariff protection in the early 1930s was structured to
protect the special interests to compete effectively against imported goods for domestic sales of their
products. See Pincus, supranote 2. This built upon earlier work by Olson and Stigler. See generally
M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1968); Stigler, supra note 6. Other researchers

provided empirical evidence to support the contention that in Canada, too, the structure of tariff
rates across industries seemed to be related to the needs of special interests rather than the economic
benefit of society as a whole. See Caves, supra note 2, at 296; Helleiner, supra note 2, at 325.
43 See app. A, chart A-3.
44 See app. A, table A-1 & chart A-3.
45 The trade sector is measured by the value of commodity imports and exports as a percentage
of gross national product.
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model." Over this period, the larger the trade sector was (compared to
the overall economy), the stronger the special interest group concern,
and the more likely it was that domestic economic conditions would be
linked to trade policies.
These observations follow directly from the argument in Section II
that trade policy is the result of government enforced consensus policies
tempered by the influence of special interest groups. This argument is
further supported by recent trends in the relative net export figures of the
United States. In contrast to prosperous post-World War II years, the
United States relative net exports dropped to -4.2% during the 1970s,
and was -16.0% from 1981 through 1986. 47 Moreover, the net merchandise export position for the United States has been negative for each
of the last ten years.4 8 It is therefore no accident that the United States
commitment to liberalization has seemed less certain over this period. In
fact, based on the framework set forth in Section II and earlier in this
section, one would have expected the recent deterioration in the net merchandise export position of the United States to have generated special
interest group efforts to undermine commitment to trade liberalization.
This is exactly what happened.
The rapid deterioration in the merchandise export position of the
United States since the mid-1970s has created a collision of interests between trade sensitive industries and government. That conflict is evident
in the current disagreement between the Congress and the executive
branch over trade policy. In addition, it is worth noting that the rapid
expansion in the relative size of the trade sector over the past twenty
years represents a return to pre-World War II proportions. During that
period tariffs averaged well over 10%, and domestic economic problems
were closely identified with international economic conditions. This
rapid growth of the trade sector-accompanied by a deterioration in the
United States trade balance and the two worst recessions since World
War II-has fueled the protectionist argument that our domestic economic problems are somehow the fault of our trading partners. Because
tariff increases are prohibited by the GATT agreements, protectionism
has had to take the form of NTBs since the 1970s.
By the mid-1970s it was clear that while tariffs were declining in the
United States and other industrial countries, there remained systematic
46 See app. A, chart A-4.
47 See app. A, table A-I & chart A-3. Relative net exports are the percentage of the total trade
deficit or surplus relative to the total trade volume of the United States. The figures cited in the text
above should be compared to the average 17.25% relative net export figure for the United States up
until 1969.
48 See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (1987)[hereinafter ECONOMIc REPORT].
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differences in protection across industries. However, there was no consensus that NTBs were a serious threat to further trade liberalization.
Further, there was no particular concern that NTBs might disguise the
extent of protectionism and thereby foster a false perception among
policymakers that gains in international economic cooperation were actually being achieved. It was not until the emergence of national and
international economic crises in the late 1970s that the power of special
interest groups in setting trade policies and the effectiveness of NTB protectionism was recognized.

V. THE SHIFT FROM TARIFFS TO NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
A.

The Growth in Non-Tariff Barriers

The rise of NTBs as trade restriction devices over the past several
decades is a development inextricably linked to governmental preferences
as to the form of protection for import sensitive industries. While protection in general was diminishing among industrial countries in the early
post-World War II period, the trade restrictions known as NTBs were
expanding in several specific areas. For example, in 1956 the United
States persuaded Japan to adopt one type of NTB, a voluntary export
restraint ("VER"),4 9 on exports of cotton textiles to the United States;5
the United Kingdom concluded a similar agreement with Hong Kong. 51
There are numerous other examples of NTBs in the post-World War
II era. 2 A number of factors help explain this shift in trade policy. The
49 VERs serve to undermine the GATT's philosophical commitment to reduce trade barriers.
GATT specifically restricts the use of quantitative restrictions unless they are applied on a mostfavored-nation ("MFN") basis and compensation is provided to affected countries. Affected countries have the right to retaliate against offending nations. GATT, supra note 3, pt. I, art. I. But
VERs are technically not barred by the GATT, because they are self-imposed limits on trade by the
exporting country rather than discriminatory quantitative restrictions by an importing country,
which would be prohibited.
50 Specific studies of VERs include that of Tosini & Tower, supra note 2.
51 Needless to say, United States imports continued to grow as exports from Hong Kong were
diverted from the United Kingdom to the United States.
52 Congressional approval of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, giving the President authority to
proceed with the Kennedy Round, was gained only after the administration concluded the ShortTerm Arrangement on Cotton Textiles in 1961 and the Long-Term Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("LTA") in 1962. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962)(current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. (1982)); Short-Term Arrangements Regarding International
Trade in Cotton Textiles, July 21, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1674, T.I.A.S. No. 4884; Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, Feb. 9, 1926, 13 U.S.T. 2672, T.I.A.S. No.
5240.
Passage of the Trade Act of 1974, authorizing the President to proceed with the Tokyo Round
of trade liberalization, was jeopardized until the Multifiber Arrangement ("MFA") was signed in
December 1973, expanding the LTA to include manufactured fibers and wool. See Trade Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975), as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19
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first is that the existence of effective income tax systems in the industrialized countries makes them less dependent on the use of tariffs to finance
central government operations than is the case for most developing nations. Second, as explained below, special interest groups that are too
large to win tariff protection (because of public resentment) may be able
to secure NTBs. These demands for protection, along with the relatively
greater number of trade restrictions that are available to industrial country governments, make the industrialized nations likely candidates for
the adoption of innovations in NTBs. Finally, there is always some domestic and international political advantage to being able to assist special
interests in a less publicizable way. NTBs have the advantage of being
more difficult to assess in terms of winners and losers and their general
welfare effects. For these reasons, industrial countries that are not required to use tariffs for revenue purposes and prefer the political advantages of NTBs in masking government support for special interest groups
are likely to prefer NTBs to tariffs.5 3
The first factor in the industrialized nations' shift to NTBs is the
fact that these countries no longer require tariff-related income. Historically, the development of nation-states meant that central governments
needed funding. Tariff revenues were one fairly easy way to get that
funding. It was not until the early twentieth century that tariffs ceased to
provide the majority of federal government revenue in the United States.
In many developing countries, tariffs continue to play a major role in
financing national government expenditures. 54 It is therefore not surprising that developing countries still rely more heavily on tariffs than do the
industrialized nations.55 Nor is it surprising that, once freed of the need
for tariff-generated revenues, the industrialized nations would lead the
way in developing NTB innovations for regulating international trade.
U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq. (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Multifiber Arrangement, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T.
1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840. MFA IV, concluded in December 1986, added silk, linen, ramie, and jute
to the list of controlled fibers. By the end of 1986, the United States had agreements on almost 650
quotas with 41 different countries.
53 Each of these reasons for the growth of NTBs, along with clarifying examples, is discussed
infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. Useful discussions of this issue can be found in Ray,
Determinantsof Tariff,supra note 2, and Ray, Tariffand NontariffBarriers,supra note 3.
54 The preference for tariffs in developing countries is a direct outgrowth of the fact that their
other fiscal or revenue raising mechanisms are typically not well developed. In developing countries,
tariffs serve the double duty of providing protection to domestic producers and of providing a major
share of the taxes collected by the national government. Quotas and other NTBs are more difficult
and expensive to administer than tariffs and therefore less attractive as a primary source of revenue
for government programs. Industrial countries that can use income taxes, value added taxes, and

other instruments to raise revenue are more likely to consider NTBs as means for restricting trade
than are developing countries.
55 Ray, The Optimum Commodity Tariff,supra note 3, at 372, 373.
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A number of historical examples illustrate the link between the need
for revenues and the existence of tariffs. First, trade liberalization in
England in the 1840s occurred only after the central government instituted an income tax system. A second example is found in the United
States. One of the most hotly contested domestic political issues during
the 1890s was whether the expanding economic role of the central government should be financed primarily with tariff revenues or through the
adoption of an income tax system. The ratification of the sixteenth
amendment in 1913 was a critical factor in the first dramatic tariff cuts in
the United States in over fifty years. 56
The second advantage of NTBs is that while GATT is equally outspoken in its condemnation of tariff and NTB restrictions on trade, it has
been much easier to ascertain the quantitative effects of tariffs than it has
been to gauge the effect of NTBs like product standardization requirements, government procurement practices, and others. Therefore, as
successive GATT rounds achieved further reductions in tariff rates,
NTBs were used either to support already weak industries, or compensate industries that were adversely affected by tariff cuts. That shift is
evidenced by multifiber agreements beginning in the early 1960s and in
the NTB protection given to the footwear, steel, and auto industries.
A third explanation for the rise in NTBs is that they can be used
effectively by special interest groups incapable of getting government
support for tariff protection.5 7 One study provides empirical support for
the notion that, other things being equal, NTBs are found predominantly
among less concentrated industries.5 8 The importance of this finding derives from this Article's earlier assumption that concentrated industries
with a small number of dominant firms have been most successful in
gaining government trade protection, and that less concentrated multifirm industries are notably less successful. 59 The study's findings suggest,
however, that where NTBs are at issue rather than tariffs, effective coalitions with even large numbers of participants are quite possible, and
more likely to be successful.
There is at least one other plausible explanation for the rise in
NTB's. Consider an industry composed of fifty firms that are each losing
domestic sales to foreign firms and therefore have a collective interest in
getting the government to restrict imports with a tariff on foreign goods.
One problem which the group faces is a firm's electing not to help in the
56 See Baack & Ray, supra note 2, at 624.
57 See Ray & Marvel, supra note 3.
58 See Ray & Marvel, supra note 3.
59 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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lobbying effort, thereby benefiting from the reduction in foreign competition along with the other forty-nine which worked for that outcome. The
one firm is therefore a free rider6" because it benefits from the collective
effort of the other producers without bearing any of the costs. The more
firms there are in an industry, the more likely it is that the free rider
problem will prevent an effective coalition from being formed because
each of the fifty firms has an incentive to try to get others to do the work
and be a free rider.
If, however, the same group of fifty firms could get the government
to restrict imports of competitive goods and distribute import licenses
among those producers that participated in the coalition to limit imports,
the group would have a means by which it could reward participants and
exclude free riders. In this case, each participant in the coalition gains
not only the benefits of reduced foreign competition but also part of the
economic rent which would have gone to the government with a tariff (in
this case, excess price) associated with the domestic sale of foreign goods.
Firms which try to free ride will still benefit from the increased price of
foreign goods but can be prevented from importing and selling foreign
goods at the higher domestic price. They will not capture any of the
tariff equivalent rents generated by the quota. This reduces the free rider
problem substantially and enhances the prospects for a successful
coalition.
Another example of an NTB would be "buy American" government
purchase plans which provide government contracts to domestic firms
that lobbied for the program while excluding free riders from access to
those government contracts. Large coalitions which could not get tariff
protection might succeed in getting "buy American" status associated
with their products. What is disturbing is that the relatively greater effectiveness of NTBs as means of rewarding participants and excluding
free riders may increase the overall extent to which protection is granted
to domestic industries.
B.

Empirical Evidence for the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers

The GATT Kennedy Round failed to deal with the problem of
NTBs and focused instead on tariff reduction. The Tokyo Round developed codes with respect to the use of NTBs, but left the issue of how to
dismantle them for later GATT rounds.6 1 In effect, then, these Rounds
60 A free rider in this context is a firm that can benefit from a policy change which other firms in
the industry paid for without having to pay anything itself.
61 In a way, the successful elimination of many of industrialized countries' tariffs may have
played a role in promoting NTBs in the same way that arms agreements may at times promote the
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left countries free to develop NTBs as a response to domestic political
economic interests.
A pair of studies found clear evidence of this, demonstrating first
that NTBs had been used in the United States and abroad to substitute
for lost tariff protection resulting from the Kennedy Round, and second,
that NTBs were systematically used to complement tariff protection in
industries which were already receiving relatively high tariff protection.62
These studies indicated that industries which had the highest tariff rates
before the Kennedy Round still had the highest tariff rates after the
round was implemented. Furthermore, NTBs introduced during the late
1960s and 1970s did not go to industries with low tariff rates after the
Kennedy Round; rather, NTB protection was given to those industries
which benefited most from tariff protection before and after the Kennedy
Round.6 3
Another study provided a more precise test of the substitution and
complementary protective effects of NTBs which were implemented in
response to the Kennedy Round tariff cuts. The study demonstrated that
industries (like steel, textiles, processed foods, and consumer durables)
which experienced small if any tariff cuts during the Kennedy Round
were precisely the industries which gained NTB protection. In short,
NTBs were not used only to substitute for the general loss of tariff protection but also to increase protection for industries least affected by
Kennedy Round tariff cuts. 64 One can conclude, therefore, that the Kennedy Round was more effective in changing the form of protectionism
than in changing the relative level of protectionism.
C.

Voluntary Export Restraints

There is one NTB innovation particularly worth mentioning in the
current context. The VER poses a particular problem for international
trade negotiations. Although GATT explicitly condemns the use of
quantitative trade restrictions (and allows for retaliatory sanctions by injured parties), it is difficult to imagine a means of policing self-imposed
development of new weapons systems. Unless there is an honest intent to disarm, there is a strong
incentive to develop new systems that bypass agreed on restrictions. So, too, if the commitment to
trade liberalization is less than sincere, there is an incentive to surrender tariff protection while
adopting new trade regulations that are even more effective.
62 See Ray, Determinants of Tariff, supra note 2; Ray, Tariff and Nontariff Barriers,supra note
3.
63 See id.
64 See Marvel & Ray, The Kennedy Round, supra note 2.
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export restrictions negotiated bilaterally. VERs effectively bribe65 foreign governments and producers with tariff-equivalent revenue 66 if they
agree to limit exports. This system avoids open confrontations that ordinary quotas invite, and, as in the case of Japanese restrictions on automobile exports to the United States, can be worth billions of dollars to
exporters and to the government of the exporting country. Since VERs
produce transfers of wealth to the exporting country, these exporters are
unlikely to complain to the GATT Council. This in turns suggests that
VERs are likely to become the trade restriction of choice for all but the
poorest nations.6 7
Moreover, in contrast to tariffs and multilateral quotas, VERs are
extremely well suited to the needs of special interest groups seeking protection. First, they are bilateral agreements worked out by consenting
rather than competing nations. They can be structured to provide protection to import sensitive industries and to provide rents to both governments and producers in the exporting countries. This means that
producers in both the importing and exporting countries can collude
with their governments in restraining competition and capturing monopoly rents at the expense of the consuming public. VERs present no incentive for retaliation and GATT has no effective means for preventing
such collusive agreements. Multilateral tariffs and quotas, on the other
hand, are likely to generate retaliation; this possibility reduces the likelihood that special interest groups within a country will succeed in having
them adopted.
United States trade policy has become clouded by the conflict between protectionist groups and the free trade oriented government. Despite the vacillations, however, the severity of the protectionist threat is
easily underestimated. NTBs are an especially dangerous weapon in the
protectionist arsenal. The fact that NTBs can reduce the free rider problem and increase the likelihood that special interest groups will be successful in their quest for protection means that NTBs markedly enhance
the protectionist threat.
This point is important and bears repetition. Imposing tariffs is a
hostile economic action, multilateral in effect and easily observed. Given
65 A bribe is meant in the sense that the foreign government and producers gain the distribution
of rents which would go to the government if a tariff were imposed.
66 The value of the rent captured by foreign governments and producers should be equal to the
rent that would be generated by an equally restrictive tariff.
67 The poorest nations will always prefer tariffs to NTBs generally because tariffs provide capital
to finance government expenditures. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is
unclear if developing country imports are at a level that demands VER protection, which is typically
reserved for developed, if failing, industry.
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the common desire of developed nations to liberalize trade after World
War II, the GATT member states had no trouble rejecting unilateral impositions of tariffs without just cause. So effective was this commitment
that tariffs declined dramatically throughout the period. Special interest
groups seeking added tariff protection for their industries generally failed
in their efforts because of the obvious international economic and political harm. Multilateral quotas have many of the same characteristics as
tariffs and are not a likely vehicle for successful protection. VERs, on
the contrary, are not multilateral in effect and are not likely to draw
complaints from the participating countries. They are therefore likely to
become an increasingly popular protectionist vehicle and deserve close
observation.
VI.

CONSEQUENCES OF TRADE POLICY CONFLICTS
A.

Special Interests and Trade Strategies

The public dialogue over trade policy in the United States changed
in the early 1970s, when the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries ("OPEC") demonstrated its power to manipulate international
trade. OPEC's actions simultaneously undermined United States national security and undercut its collective political commitment to international economic cooperation. The subsequent rise in oil prices affected
a few key industries severely; this in turn adversely affected the economic
base upon which the United States commitment to trade liberalization
rested.
The first oil crisis in 1974 led to public discussion of possible retaliatory moves against OPEC. The proposed alternatives included the imposition of an oil import quota, the withholding of bushels (of wheat) for
barrels (of oil), and the creation of an industrial country buyers' cartel to
negotiate guaranteed long-term prices for OPEC oil.68 Fortunately, none
of those alternatives was adopted. It was obvious, however, that the
United States trade position had moved from a strong commitment to
trade liberalization to the view that freer trade was only one of many
options.
Many factors contributed to the abandonment (by the time of the
Tokyo Round Agreements concluded in 1979) of any continuing commitment to unqualified free trade by the United States.6 9 Numerous conflicts and special bilateral agreements with our trading partners have
68 For a more detailed discussion of OPEC, see A. MACBEAN & P. SNOWDEN, supra note 11.
69 These factors included accelerating inflation in the United States, high energy prices, government regulations on domestic oil prices and auto emmissions, and the emergence of West Germany
and Japan as genuine competitors for steel and auto sales in the United States.
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underscored this fact.7 ° Domestic political events, like Walter Mondale's
campaign argument that trade policy should be based on "fair" trade (as
opposed to "free" trade) have also contributed to the changing trade environment. Although Mondale lost his presidential bid, the United
States is still wrestling with the question of whether to advocate multilateral free trade or shift to more limited bilateral agreements with individual trading partners.
The ambivalence of the United States position on multilateral free
trade was recently demonstrated by the Reagan administration's call for
the next round of GATT negotiations at the same time it was negotiating
a bilateral free trade agreement with Israel and attempting a similar arrangement with Canada. Other examples of the shift from multilateralism in United States trade policy include the recent graduation of certain
countries from the GSP (the GSP is itself a multilateral derogation from
the MFN principle). The executive branch is not alone in its confusionCongress is now in conference on a comprehensive trade bill that, among
other things, threatens bilateral trade restrictions against countries that
have large trade surpluses with the United States. Regardless of how
well-intentioned or effective such programs may be, they clearly imply
that the United States is no longer unqualifiedly committed to MFN
trade policies.
The current conflict over trade policy between industry special interest groups and the national government has resulted in some surprising
and disturbing changes in United States trade policy. These changes
have been demonstrated by recent empirical work. One study examined
the post-Kennedy Round structure of tariff and NTB protection in the
United States, Canada, Japan, and the European Economic Community
("EEC" or "Community"). 7 1 The statistical evidence indicated that by
the mid-1970s protectionist interests had become strong enough to cripple legislation intended to assist developing countries in their efforts to
expand exports of manufactured goods to the United States and other
70 Examples of these conflicts and agreements include:
1) trigger prices for steel imports;
2) Japanese voluntary export quotas on auto exports to the United States;
3) government loan guarantees to Chrysler;
4) multifiber agreements;
5) semiconductor agreements between the United States and Japan not to compete against each
other for sales;
6) arguments between the United States and the European Economic Community ("EEC")
over wheat sales to Egypt and compensation payments to the United States for lost export sales in
Spain resulting from its membership in the EEC; and
7) arguments with Canada over Canadian lumber product sales in the United States.
71 Ray & Marvel, supra note 3.
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industrial nations. This trend continues into the 1980s as protectionist
interests continue to gain strength. The issue is no longer whether protectionist special interest groups are sufficiently powerful to undermine
the effectiveness of trade liberalizing legislation but rather whether or not
there is any life left in the free trade movement.
A review of some empirical work in the area helps to illustrate how
special interests have undermined trade liberalizing legislation. One general finding was that the post-Kennedy Round structure of tariffs and
NTBs among the industrialized nations was systematically biased against
imports of consumer durables, processed agricultural products, and textiles.7 2 These products constitute the manufacturing areas in which developing countries are expected to have the best chance of competing for
sales. This suggests that trade liberalization under GATT did not help
increase developing country access to industrial country markets for
manufactured goods.7 3
Many developing countries complained that the Kennedy Round
had not provided them many potential export gains. Most industrial
countries (including the United States) adopted their own GSPs to provide developing countries with duty free access to developed markets.
Unfortunately, the same special interests in the United States which
sought to minimize trade liberalizing aspects of the Kennedy Round
worked to prevent the GSP7 4 from undercutting the residual protection
still in place after the Kennedy Round. One recent study found that the
GSP and the CBI were both sabotaged in this manner. Based on an
analysis of United States imports in 1984, it is apparent that the GSP and
CBI did not provide preferential access to United States markets for exports from developing countries in consumer goods, textiles, or manufactured foods. Indeed, the study found that the programs had not even
improved access for those goods heavily protected by tariffs before the
preferences were granted.7 5 If both the GSP and the CBI began as genuine efforts to provide developing countries with access to United States
markets for key manufactured exports, the fact that special interest
groups were able to influence the final legislation to the point of making
it irrelevant in both cases is a bit chilling. In terms of our model, it
suggests that our long-standing national commitment to trade liberaliza72 See id.
73 Papers dealing with the impact of United States trade policies on imports from developing
countries include D. CLARKE, supra note 3; Grossman, supra note 3; E. Ray, U.S. Protection, supra
note 3; Ray & Marvel, supra note 3.
74 The GSP was first adopted in the United States in 1975 and renewed in 1985.
75 Ray, Impact of Special Interests, supra note 3, at 187 n.2, 190.
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tion is close to being canceled by the power of special interest groups to
thwart government efforts at international economic cooperation.
A further example of bias against developing countries is found in
the argument that intra-industry trade,76 or trade in closely related products, may serve as a continuing impetus for trade liberalization over
time.7 7 In the context of the model, the argument states that as intraindustry trade expands, the clash between import and export interests
diminishes and therefore the relevance of special interest groups in shaping trade policy declines. Thus, continued intra-industry trade should
reduce protectionist pressures.
Another empirical study, however, found that while intra-industry
trade does indeed reduce protection in the form of tariffs, 78 intra-industry
trade occurs primarily in made-to-order, labor-intensive, intermediate
goods that are produced in small firms. 79 Those are not the kinds of
goods commonly exported from developing countries. The study, therefore, suggests that although expanding intra-industry trade may promote
further trade liberalization, it is likely to help industrialized countries at
the expense of developing nations.8 0
Additional insights into future protectionist trends from the model
follow from an examination of protectionism in the EEC. One study
found that of all the industrialized areas, the EEC exhibited the most
pervasive use of trade restrictions if tariffs and NTBs are viewed together.8 1 This suggests that one effect of the expansion of the EEC to
include less homogeneous members such as Spain and Portugal may be
to increase the Community's common external trade restrictions. If so, it
may mean that as the EEC has expanded, the trade diverting effect of
having additional members has begun to outweigh its positive effect on
trade expansion.82
To understand this point, one needs some background in how com76 Intra-industry trade has been expanding rapidly in recent years.
77 See Krugman, supra note 3.
78 This occurs because export interests undercut the effectiveness of importers in obtaining tariff
protection on closely related goods. See Marvel & Ray, Intraindustry Trade, supra note 2, at 128687.
79 Id. at 1283-85.
80 One of the authors of that study analyzed the characteristics of United States bilateral intraindustry trade with Canada, Japan, the EEC, Mexico, Brazil, South America, and the Caribbean
Basin using 1984 trade data for manufacturing. The results indicated that intra-industry trade with
developing countries and regions is systematically biased away from industries that enjoy substantial
tariff or NTB protection in the United States (such as textiles, consumer manufactures, and
processed food products). See E. Ray, U.S. Protection, supra note 3.
81 Ray & Marvel, supra note 3, at 452 n.3.
82 Id. at 452, 453.
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mon external trade barriers are agreed to within the EEC. When a country like Spain joins the EEC, it must adopt the external trade restrictions
which special interest groups within the EEC have already secured.
Since Spain's production mix and competitive industries are somewhat
different from those of other members, however, Spain will also bring its
own special interest groups to the EEC bargaining process. Those
groups seek supporters in other EEC countries and in some cases succeed
in generating additional trade restrictions not present before the new
member joined the community. The aforementioned increase in protection is a consequence of these new trade restrictions on imports from
non-member nations. As indicated earlier, the magnitude of the increase
in trade diversion resulting from the continued expansion of the EEC is
demonstrated by the finding that the EEC has uniformly higher levels of
protection across manufacturing than any of the other major industrial
areas. 3 Expansion of the EEC, therefore, to include countries like Spain
and Portugal (whose economies are quite different from those of existing
members) enhances competition within the Community, but also increases the likelihood that special interest groups will gain the political
clout needed to generate new trade restrictions to be implemented against
non-EEC members.
B.

The Current Transition in United States Trade Policy

To understand why United States trade policy is in transition now,
one must look to the rapid increase in the trade sector relative to overall
economic activity in the United States in the last fifteen years.8 4 The rise
in international trade relative to GNP8 5 and the deterioration in the merchandise trade balance in the United States was related to the rapid rise
in oil prices in 1974 and again in 1980. In turn, these rises played a
significant role in generating the recessions of 1974-75 and 1980. This
combination of increased trade relative to GNP, the deterioration in the
trade balance, and economic recessions, surely contributed to public
sympathy for the idea that economic problems in the United States were
induced by foreign economic conditions and policies. It is therefore not
surprising that both the Carter and Reagan administrations experienced
substantial political pressure to do "something" about the international
trade situation in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
What is not clear, however, is why protectionist pressures have increased in the last few years. Since 1983, there has been a continuous
83 Id.

84 This discussion is based on the data found in Appendix B.
85 See app. B, chart B-1.
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economic recovery and expansion in the United States. The dramatic
decline in OPEC oil prices in 1986-a decline not fully reversed in
1987-should, according to the proposed framework, have helped avoid
a decline in relative net exports. Such a decline would have led to increased pressure for trade restrictions. Despite declining oil prices, however, the relative net merchandise export position of the United States
continued to deteriorate throughout the first six years of this decade from
an average of -9.3% for 1981 through 1983, to -20.4% in 1984,
-22.5% in 1985, and -25.1% in 1986.86 Given the model, which
projects a direct relationship between net export position and the extent
to which special interest groups favor trade liberalization,87 this recent
deterioration should have been expected to lead special interest groups to
step up their lobbying against trade liberalization.
The next logical question is: why has the merchandise trade position
of the United States continued to deteriorate throughout the 1980s? The
primary cause of the continuing deterioration in the net merchandise export position 88 of the United States was the dramatic increase in the
trade weighted value of the United States dollar between 1980 and 1985,
an increase that only began to reverse itself in 1986. Based on an index
of exchange rates with 1973 equal to approximately 100, the value of the
dollar increased almost 60% between 1980 and 1985.89 By itself, that
change in the value of the dollar would lower the price of imports 60%
and raise the foreign price of our exports by 60%. Not surprisingly, that
kind of change in import and export prices generated a serious deterioration in our commodity trade position. Currently, however, there is a
reversal in this process. With some lag, one can expect the rapid fall in
the value of the dollar that began in 1986 and has continued throughout
1987 to reduce the merchandise trade deficit further, and in the process
reduce the pressure on Congress for protection from industry special interest groups. How much improvement will occur depends upon interest
rate stability in the United States, and the extent to which high interest
rates (presumably associated with large federal government deficits) persist, and upon the continuing rapid expansion of the economies of our
major trading partners relative to that in the United States.
Another determinant of protectionist pressure in the United States
is the national unemployment rate.9° This Article argued -earlier that
86 See ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 48.

87
88
89
90

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Also known as the commodity trade position.
See ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 48, at 113-16; see also app. B, chart B-2.
See app. B, chart B-3.
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there is a national commitment to provide a safety net for failing industries and jobs. To the extent that the unemployment problem has become
more severe in the United States in recent years, this model leads one to
expect our commitment to free international trade to weaken. The overall unemployment picture has worsened significantly since 1974. The civilian unemployment rate in the United States averaged 5.49% in the
post-war period before that time and 8.43% between 1975 and 1986.
The average unemployment rate since 1974 has exceeded the unemployment rate in any year between 1947 and 1974. Given this, it is not surprising that politicians have been especially sensitive to the possible
impact of free trade on domestic unemployment.
There is one quite positive aspect of the foregoing discussion that
should be noted before proceeding to an assessment of possible future
trends in international trade and economic conditions. Although the
three factors cited above9 1 have combined to intensify pressure on the
federal government to restrict trade, basic United States policy continues
to tilt toward trade liberalization, despite protectionist victories like the
proliferation of NTBs and the undermining of the effectiveness of programs like the GSP and the CBI. The pure special interest group explanation of trade policy would not predict such a persistent commitment to
freer international trade, given economic conditions in the United States
between 1974 and 1986. Moreover, current shifts in economic conditions
in the United States and abroad are away from the patterns that contributed to the original intensification of protectionist pressures. If those
trends continue, it is likely that the traditional commitment to trade liberalization in the United States will both continue and become more apparent to our trading partners than it has been in recent years.
C. The Emerging Pattern of Protectionism
The direction that trade policies will take in the United States and
abroad over the next few years will obviously be affected by economic
conditions, particularly in the major industrial countries. The description in Section II of the basic model and the sections that followed, made
it clear that the prospects for renewed international economic cooperation depend directly on the net export position of the United States, the
severity of the unemployment problem in the industrial nations, and
growth in real income over time. This Section discusses the likelihood
91 To reiterate, these three factors are: 1) the increase in the importance of the trade sector
relative to GNP in the United States; 2) continued high unemployment rates; and 3) the prolonged
adverse movement in the United States commodity trade statistics.
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that economic conditions will change in ways which will promote or impede trade liberalization.
A key factor in the emerging pattern of protectionism will be the
level of international trade in the coming years. Current estimates of the
average growth rates for imports and exports for developed countries for
the 10 years ending in 1988 are 4.6%, compared to the ten-year averages
of 6.3% (imports) and 7.3% (exports) for 1969 through 1978.92 This
suggests that the slow-down in growth of world trade that began in the
decade after 1969 has continued in the last decade. A pure special interest analysis would lead one to conclude that the lack of dramatic growth
in world trade among the industrialized nations of the sort realized in the
first two decades after World War II, will continue to blunt enthusiasm
for further trade liberalization. On the other hand, the expected improvement in the export performance of the United States relative to
growth in imports for 1987 and 1988 93-which is largely associated with
the fall in the international value of the United States dollar-should
groups within
help to swing the net impact of industry special interest
94
trade.
freer
favoring
toward
the United States back
The slow-down in the rate of growth of imports and exports applies
to developing countries as well. The decline in export growth in developing countries became particularly severe after 1980. One factor in this
was low growth among their trading partners. Developing countries'
trading partner growth declined from an average of 4.9% between 1969
and 1978, to 2.8% per year from 1979 to 1988.1' It is critical to developing countries that exports to hard-currency, industrialized nations continue. Unless economic conditions begin to favor growth in the
92 See app. C, table C-1.
93 See id.
94 The presumption that the decline in the value of the dollar will substantially improve the
United States balance of trade position may prove incorrect for at least three reasons.
1) The value of the dollar has declined relative to the Japanese yen and the Deutsche mark, but
it has remained stable relative to the currencies of many other trading partners, particularly developing nations. Thus the falling value of the dollar is likely to encourage exports to-and discourage
imports from-only a few of the major trading partners of the United States.
2) United States exports to developing countries grew rapidly during the years prior to the
world debt crisis. The debt problems of developing countries have persisted and efforts to handle
these problems have resulted in slower real growth and dampened demand for imports from the
United States.
3) The rate of inflation in the United States has begun to accelerate and rates of interest are
beginning to rise. If that process continues, the dollar will rise in value on world markets and net
exports will decline. Whether or not the recent decline in the value of the dollar persists is particularly important from a timing standpoint. Success in the current round of multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva depends heavily on the leadership provided by the United States, and the extent of
such leadership will surely depend upon the international trade situation during the negotiations.
95 See app. C, table C-2.
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industrial countries, the capital scarcity problem facing the developing
countries is likely to become increasingly onerous.
The foregoing limits on possible hard-currency earnings through exports to industrialized countries would be bad even if many of the developing countries were not already faced with staggering international
debts. Current actions by major banks such as Citicorp, Chase Manhattan, and Morgan Guaranty to write off bad loans to developing countries
have created a misleadingly optimistic impression. While the banks
themselves have been successfully working their way out from under the
burden of their bad loans to developing countries, the burden of those
96
debts on the developing countries themselves has actually gotten worse.
Generally, bankers consider an external debt to export ratio in excess of
300% to be unsustainable. Only those developing countries that have
been successful in exporting manufactured goods have been able to avoid
external debt problems of close to crisis proportions. 97 The magnitude of
the debt problem facing the most heavily indebted and the poorest developing countries has actually increased in the last five years.
Further perspective on the magnitude of the external debt problem
can be seen in the ratio of external debt to domestic productive capacity.
Except for countries exporting manufactured goods, the external debt
burden on developing countries is half their domestic output, and is continuing to increase relative to the ability of developing countries to create
goods and services. 98
The international debt crisis is far from over. Developing countries
should not miss the opportunity in Geneva during the GATT Uruguay
Round to stress the need for a relatively unrestricted opportunity for
their manufactured exports to compete in the industrialized countries.
Finally, the effectiveness of the next round of negotiations must be
measured by the degree to which they curb the use of NTBs. The relative effectiveness of NTBs as a means of avoiding the free rider problem
of effective coalition formation or to buy off foreign exporters, virtually
assures us that the protectionist threat will never be safely put to rest. To
the extent, however, that a framework for reducing their impact can be
built, NTB damage to free trade can be limited.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it seems clear that the period of United States dominance in international economic competition is over, and with it the una96 Data on the external debt problem of developing countries is found in Appendix D.
97 See app. D, table D-1.
98 See app. D, table D-2.
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nimity with which United States politicians pushed for trade
liberalization in the early post-World War II period. It is also clear that
NTB innovations to restrict trade have had the net effect of strengthening
protectionist interests. On balance, however, the continued growth
within the United States and the accompanying decline in the unemployment rate to 6% by August 198791 has reduced the pressure to use protectionist measures to provide a safety net for industries and workers.
The decline in the dollar has already begun to reduce the commodity
trade deficit and moderate the impact of special interest groups. Thus,
the United States has not abandoned its commitment to further trade
liberalization, although the commitment does remain somewhat shaky.
The world seems poised for a long struggle over international economic cooperation, however. Without greater growth rates in industrial
and developing countries, the drive to liberalize world trade will be
thwarted by special interest groups. Yet without further-and genuineliberalization in world trade, the prospects for accelerated real growth
rates are not good. It is hoped that this Article has identified some of the
factors that determine the nature of the ongoing struggle between free
trade and protectionist interests, and shown the importance of NTBs as
hindrances to further world economic growth. While this work may not
provide the answers, it may provide conceptual tools with which to face
the problem.

99 110 MONTHLY LABOR REvIEW 77 n.2 (Aug. 1987).
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Appendix A
CHART A-1
PROTECTION AND INCOME GROWTH:
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CHART A-3
TARIFF RATES AND RELATIVE EXPORT STRENGTH:
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CHART A-4
TARIFF RATES AND THE SIZE OF THE TRADE SECTOR:
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TABLE A-1
U.S.

TARIFFS AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

YEAR

Tariff
Rate (%)'

GNP per Capita
(S),

1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

17.4353
16.1058
11.5713
8.7984
7.5170
5.8008
4.6172
5.9975
11.9970
11.1948
14.5352
14.8110
12.7607
12.8762
14.2807
13.6808
13.4946
18.9111
17.8469
24.4047
16.6060
17.7784
13.9461
15.1929
15.2894
16.5295
13.2352
12.2683
10.6850
10.5459
6.6971
8.2689
6.5014
8.3679
7.9859
5.3328
5.3390
4.4819
5.4492
4.9179
5.4305
5.2352
5.0750
5.3269
5.5301
6.0377
6.0418
7.4946
6.7636
7.0416
7.0837
6.7142
6.7082
6.9395
7.08773
6.18250
6.47838
6.10568
5.68464
5.89100
4.52205
3.21663
3.74945
3.28413
3.39510
3.73863
3.51196
2.87247

407
389
398
473
585
740
804
860
641
673
760
742
804
826
797
805
848
738
615
467
444
516
570
647
706
656
698
757
937
1175
1405
1522
1518
1484
1617
1770
1731
1889
2144
2217
2299
2259
2420
2507
2592
2582
2755
2802
2855
3028
3152
3323
3556
3845
4023
4351
4656
4841
5189
5649
6258
6705
7173
7878
8708
9720
10741
11566

2

4

Tariff Rate

=

GNP/Capita

=

Recessions

=

Relative Net
Exports

-

Recessipns
(1.0)
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
I
11
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
00
1

Relative Net
Exports (%)
17.4080
10.2596
34.0607
39.2960
36.0698
34.9135
37.9947
22.3368
28.1364
10.4738
4.9188
12.5460
7.7403
4.4789
8.0460
11.5859
9.0112
11.7304
8.1058
10.7641
6.9624
11.8720
1.1919
0.8567
4.0712
19.7563
16.2960
20.9030
22.0002
44.8368
53.3428
54.1795
40.7947
39.7897
45.8722
27.4133
27.9719
5.8183
12.0658
10.7506
6.1444
11.0643
11.1633
15.6560
19.0881
11.7891
3.6137
14.2641
16.1382
12.3280
13.3483
15.4810
10.3100
6.9645
6.643
0.920
1.378
2.647
-2.542
-6.100
0.642
-2.646
4.410
-4.015
-11.329
10.620
-6.900
-5.376

(Customs Revenue/Merchandise Imports) X 100
Nominal Gross National Product/Population
A dummy variable with a value of I for years in which unemployment was 10% or higher in the nonfarm
sector of the United States economy, and 0 otherwise.
(Merchandise Exports - Merchandise Imports)
(Merchandise Exports + Merchandise Imports)

Sources: See Appendi xE
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Appendix B
CHART B-i
GNP: 1947-1986
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TABLE B-1

U.S. TRADE AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS:
YEAR
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

Trade Relative
to GNP (%)'
9.4699
8.0238
7.3890
6.7319
7.6849
6.9797
6.3761
6.3465
6.4871
7.1992
7.4000
6.5306
6.5111
6.7904
6.6010
6.5477
6.5799
6.9192
6.9364
7.2422
7.1861
7.6186
7.6899
8.2360
8.2495
8.8689
10.6988
14.0812
13.2409
13.8838
14.2055
14.6895
16.3906
16.0023
16.4498
14.4927
13.8215
14.6699
13.8387
13.8783

'

=

2

-

Trade Relative to GNP
United States Dollar
Exchange Rate
Civilian Unemployment
Rate
Sources: See Appendix E

-

1947-1986

U.S. Dollar
Exchange Rate2

Civilian Unemployment
Rate (%)3

120.0
122.1
122.4
121.1
117.8
109.1
99.1
101.4
98.5
105.6
103.3
92.4
88.1
87.4
102.9
116.6
125.3
138.3
143.2
112.0

5.40
4.49
7.28
6.35
3.86
3.50
3.34
6.55
5.12
4.78
4.92
8.01
6.33
6.39
7.79
6.33
6.45
5.84
5.04
4.17
4.22
3.91
3.81
5.44
6.60
6.21
5.35
6.19
9.62
8.67
7.88
6.69
6.43
7.96
8.53
11.11
10.10
8.40
8.00
7.74

(Merchandise Exports/Nominal GNP) X 100
Based on a market basket of currencies with 100 equal
to real value of dollar in 1973.
The nonfarm civilian unemployment rate, constructed as X 100
(civilian unemployment/nonfarm employment
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Appendix E
DATA SOURCES
Nominal GNP

GNP per capita

1913-1928:
1929-1976:
1977-1986:

HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, Fl, at 224
NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT AccouNTs 1929-1976, 1,

1913-1928:

HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, Series F-5,

2

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1983, 1987

224
1929-1976:

NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT AccouNTs

1929-1976, 318,

319

Customs
Revenue

Merchanise
Imports
Merchandise
Exports
Recessions

1977-1980:

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1983, 1987

1913-1970:

HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, Series

Y344, Y353, 1105-06
1974
1981

1971-1980:

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

1913-1970:

HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, Series U9,

864
1974, 1980, 1987

1971-1986:

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

1913-1970:

HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, Series U2,

864
1971-1986:

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1974, 1982, 1987

1913-1941:
1942-1980:

See nonfarm unemployment rate
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1984, No.

19, 545
Trade Weighted
Dollar

1967-1986:

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1987

Nonfarm
Unemployment
Rate

1913-1970:

HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, Series D-10,

1971-1986:

ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT

126
1983, 1987

